Kant and the Problem of Self-Knowledge by Forgione Luca

Author:Forgione, Luca
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (CAM)
Published: 2018-09-26T00:00:00+00:00

I Think and the Direct Reference Theory

Some scholars have developed Kant’s views on the semantic device of I think so as to appraise their analogies to contemporary claims about the direct reference of I. According to the features of the direct reference theory highlighted in Chapter 1, we are reminded of two theses concerning the use of the term/concept I: essential indexicality and lack of identification.

(1) The term/concept I employed in a self-conscious or I*-thought is essentially indexical. More specifically, I is a singular term/concept governed by the token-reflexive rule, whereby every token of “I” refers to the subject that has produced or used it, either mentally or linguistically; with the information available in context, and once all evaluation circumstances are established, this rule is prima facie sufficient to determine its reference. Thus, moving from the contextual factors, the reference relationship between I and the subject who has produced it is determined in a direct way. By virtue of the token-reflexive rule, the fact that a subject produces the relevant token “I” makes her the very referent of that token; nonetheless, the process of indexical production does not occur within the propositional or thought content. For instance, when Nicola thinks the thought “I am happy”, the fact that he is the subject who has produced the token I determines that the I refers to him; however, it is the subject, i.e., Nicola, not the fact that he has produced the token, which enters the content of that thought. As a result, it can be argued that reference is direct: The singular term I is directly referential.

(2) The reference of the I is determined without the subject observing or identifying herself as the subject who possesses a specific property: In other words, without the possibility of misidentifying or making thoughts liable to error through misidentification relative to the concept I, as discussed in the first chapter according to Shoemaker, and as explained from a Kantian perspective in the preceding chapter. It is a fact that a subject produces an occurrence of “I” that guarantees that this “I” will refer to that subject, not to the subject’s observation and identification of herself. Indexical information about oneself based on the use of I cannot be reduced to non-indexical information; for this reason, indexicality is essential. In other words, token-reflexive expressions such as the term/concept “I” are essential indexicals, as they cannot be eliminated or replaced by names, descriptions, or demonstratives without losing the content expressed by the sentences/thoughts that contain them: To refer to (to think of) oneself qua oneself, the subject has to use the essential indexical I. ‘Essentiality’ lies in the fact that, although the use of I is not based on any cognitive mediation, it is indispensable in order to form I-thoughts; this entails that an identifying description is a neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the subject to refer to herself (cf. supra, Chapter 1).

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